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THE FUTURE OF CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE DEVELOPMENTS: WHAT







The Supreme Court in 1965 extended the protection of the
confrontation clause to state court defendants.' That holding led to
unprecedented judicial and academic attention to a sixth amend-
ment provision which previously had played a relatively insignificant
role in the administration of criminal justice.
The Court's confrontation decisions in the last quarter century
have treated diverse questions. This Article divides these confron-
tation issues into five categories, which are admittedly not complete
enough to embrace all possible confrontation questions: 1) hearsay
and confrontation, as in Dutton v. Evans2 and Bourjaily v. United
States;3 2) substantive domestic law restrictions on cross-examina-
tion and impeachment, as in Davis v. Alaska4 and Olden v. Kentucky;5
3) procedural limitations upon face-to-face confrontation, without
substantive limitations upon cross-examination, as in Coy v. Iowa;6 4)
confrontation and discovery, as in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie;7 and 5)
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1964;
J.D., Northwestern University, 1967. Professor Ronald Allen provided helpful criticisms
of an early draft of this article.
1 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
2 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
3 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
4 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
5 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988).
6 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
7 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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confrontation restrictions upon the use of limiting instruction pro-
cedures, as in Bruton v. United States.
8
Despairing of finding meaningful guidance for resolving mod-
ern confrontation issues in historical materials, thoughtful jurists
and scholars have offered their own interpretations of the confron-
tation clause.9 Most of the more ambitious academic theoreticians
have focused on the hearsay-confrontation decisions. 10 These writ-
ers have criticized the Supreme Court's approach to hearsay and
confrontation, usually concluding that it provides too little constitu-
tional protection for the accused."
In venturing guesses about future confrontation clause devel-
opments, and in offering suggestions, I take a step back from the
hearsay-confrontation segment to get a better view of the whole pic-
ture. From this vantage, without regard to theory, the differences in
the results as they might be charted on a liberal-conservative graph
are amazing. For example, in one case, the Supreme Court found a
confrontation clause violation where the accused had a full opportu-
nity to cross-examine his accusers in the jury's presence, limited
only by the inability of the accusers to observe the defendant during
8 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), is also a case in
which the Court viewed jury instructions as inadequate to prevent misuse of a hearsay
statement and therefore used the confrontation clause to invalidate the procedure.
9 See, e.g., M. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988);Jonakit, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988); Kirst, The Proce-
dural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEa. L. REV. 485 (1987); Note, Reconciling the
Conflict Between the Coconspirator Exemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, 85 CoLum. L. REV. 1294 (1985); Comment, The Confrontation Clause
and the Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship in Need of a Practical Analysis, 14 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 949 (1987). For another thoughtful discussion, see Seidelson, The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
51 (1988).
Older commentary concerning confrontation theory includes Baker, The Right to
Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules and Due Process-A Proposalfor Determining When Hearsay May
Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); K. Graham, The Right of Confronta-
tion and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99 (1972);
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978); Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say on
Hearsay, 13 UCLA L. REV. 366 (1966).
Most commentators are critical of the Court's declaration that "indicia of reliabil-
ity" can substitute for cross-examination so as to fulfill the confrontation clause guar-
anty. This criticism is wholly apart from their view of whether courts should require the
prosecution to demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant before allowing it
to introduce a hearsay declaration. See infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
10 K. Graham, supra note 9; Jonakit, supra note 9; Kirst, supra note 9; Western, supra
note 9.
11 K. Graham, supra note 9, at 128-34; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 70-82; Note, supra
note 9, at 1304-16. The reference is to the substitution of "reliability" for cross-exami-
nation. See infra text accompanying notes 33-49.
[Vol. 81
FUTURE OF CONFRONTATION
their testimony. 12 By contrast, the Court has allowed routine use of
out-of-court accusations, without permitting any cross-examination
by the defendant of the declarant, without requiring the prosecutor
to demonstrate either the reliability of the particular hearsay utter-
ance or the unavailability of the declarant, and without affording the
jury an opportunity to scrutinize the declarant's demeanor.' 3
In the hearsay-confrontation cases, the Court has come close to
adopting Justice Harlan's dictum that the confrontation clause
should not shape the rules of evidence. 14 At the same time, in strik-
ing down domestic law limitations upon certain avenues of cross-
examination and impeachment, the Court, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist, with little fanfare, has embarked upon a course that
could lead to very substantial constitutional law modifications of the
domestic rules of evidence in criminal cases.15
Additionally, the hearsay decisions are difficult to reconcile with
the limiting instruction cases. Bruton appears to prohibit de facto
use by a jury of a codefendant's accusation against a defendant
where the domestic law prohibits such use but relies upon limiting
instructions which direct the jury to observe such restriction. 16 On
the other hand, the hearsay-confrontation cases 17 allow states to
make de jure use against a defendant of some of the very codefend-
ant confessions which, under Bruton, would create confrontation
clause problems if a state were to exclude them de jure while admit-
ting them de facto through use of inadequate limiting instructions.' 8
Although there is little hope that a coherent theory of confron-
tation will emerge in the coming years, the Supreme Court probably
will strive to reconcile the different lines of confrontation cases to
produce a more uniform result. The Court's recent decision to
grant certiorari in two cases posing different confrontation issues
reinforces this belief.' 9 Expecting that the various lines of authority
12 For a discussion of Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), see infra text accompanying
notes 80-86.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 23-49.
14 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93-100 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 49-71.
16 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
17 These are the cases from Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74, through Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
540 (1986).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 97-103; see also Haddad & Agin, A Potential
Revolution in Bruton Doctrine: Is Bruton Applicable Where Domestic Evidence Rules Prohibit Use of
a Codefendant's Confession as Evidence Against a Defendant Although the Confrontation Clause
Would Allow Such Use?, forthcoming in 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (Summer 1990).
19 See Idaho v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
1107 (1990), aft'd, 58 U.S.L.W. 5036 (U.S. June 27, 1990) (No. 89-260); Craig v. Mary-
land, 316 Md. 551,560 A.2d 1120 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990), vacatedand
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will no longer remain independent satellites, this Article examines
each of the areas in an effort to foresee what changes may occur with
respect to confrontation clause interpretation.
II. HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION: CONFRONTATION WITHOUT
CROSS-EXAMINATION
As we enter the 1990s, two rules capture the current Supreme
Court approach to confrontation clause challenges to the prosecu-
tion's use of hearsay evidence. First, according to the principle de-
veloped in United States v. Inadi,20 the prosecution ordinarily can use
hearsay evidence without, at the time of trial, demonstrating the un-
availability of the hearsay declarant. Second, according to the
Bourjaily21 principle, the prosecution ordinarily can use hearsay that
fits within a domestic law hearsay exception, even without making a
particularized showing of the reliability of the hearsay declaration.
Because of these rules, the confrontation clause offers little protec-
tion beyond that afforded by domestic hearsay law. This is true
even though some contend that the unfettered use of hearsay
against criminal defendants is exactly what the confrontation clause
was meant to prevent.
A. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE HEARSAY DECLARANT
As Professor Michael Graham has perceptively observed, the
tendency of courts is to shape the confrontation clause to conform
to pre-existing domestic evidence law.22 They do not wish to re-
strict the prosecution's use of hearsay beyond limitations which have
evolved in domestic evidence law over the centuries. The opposite
approach could lead to a quagmire. The courts would have to de-
velop a separate body of hearsay principles, applicable only in crimi-
nal cases and only when the prosecution offers the hearsay.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has rejected theories which
would require major modifications of domestic hearsay rules. For
example, it has rejected the principle that prefers live testimony
over hearsay when the hearsay declarant is available at the time of
remanded, 58 U.S.L.W. 5044 (U.S. June 27, 1990) (No. 89-478). Both cases involve chil-
dren and confrontation issues. The Idaho case concerns use of a child's hearsay state-
ment, and the Maryland case involves use of a child's testimony through closed-circuit
television. Will the Court approve the use of hearsay, which totally denies a defendant
an opportunity to cross-examine, while disapproving a technique which affords the de-
fendant an opportunity to cross-examine? The cases in tandem may provide the Court
with an excellent opportunity to reconcile two different lines of confrontation cases.
20 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
21 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
22 Graham, supra note 9, at 549, 568.
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trial. 23 Such a rule of preference can take either of two forms, a fact
that jurists and scholars sometimes overlook. In the first form, the
confrontation clause would prohibit the prosecution from offering
as substantive evidence any out-of-court statement of a hearsay de-
clarant where that declarant is available at the time of trial. In a
second form, the rule would allow the use of hearsay as substantive
evidence where the hearsay declarant is available at the time of trial,
but only if the prosecution produces the declarant and makes him or
her available to the defense for cross-examination. After seemingly
accepting one or another of these rules in Ohio v. Roberts,24 the
Supreme Court in Inadi held that the rule of preference applies only
in a narrow class of cases, noting that Roberts dealt only with hearsay
admitted under the former testimony exception.25
If the Court adopted a rule favoring live testimony, it would
impose upon the prosecution a requirement in garden-variety situa-
tions where none exists under traditional domestic law. None of the
twenty-four exceptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 803 require
a showing of the unavailability of the hearsay declarant. 26 If the
Court declared that the confrontation clause requires such a show-
ing, the prosecution would have to demonstrate the unavailability of
the hearsay declarant (or, under the second form of the rule of pref-
erence, would have to produce the declarant) before, for example, it
could use business records, official records, or coconspirator
declarations.2 7
So far the United States Supreme Court has provided no list of
hearsay exceptions as to which the confrontation clause requires a
showing of the declarant's unavailability. In the coming decades,
however, courts will likely hold that no showing of unavailability is
required as to most hearsay exceptions. They will limit Roberts al-
most exclusively to cases in which the prosecution relies upon the
former testimony exception.
The language of Inadi contains the seeds of such development.
23 For a discussion of this approach, see generally Westen, supra note 9, at 613-24;
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182-83, 186-87 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
25 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-94 (1986). Roberts concerned FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(l)-the former testimony exception-and Inadi concerned FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E)-the exception for admissions by a coconspirator. Id.
26 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24). Arguably, the necessity of showing the unavailability
of other evidence before a party can utilize the "catchall" exception of Rule 803(24)
means that ordinarily the declarant will be unavailable at the time a court permits use of
Rule 803(24). However, if unavailability of the declarant were always required, Rule
803(24) would be superfluous, in light of catchall exception Rule 804(b) (5), which ex-
plicitly requires a showing of unavailability.
27 See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E), 803(b), 803(8).
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In Inadi, the Court suggested that often the circumstances surround-
ing an earlier statement will make it more valuable in the truth-de-
termining process than would be a version of events recited by the
declarant in the presence of the trier of fact.28 The Inadi Court
placed coconspirator declarations in this category; it suggested that
the rationale for the coconspirator exception is that circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement tend to guarantee its trust-
worthiness. 29 The implication is that the confrontation clause will
not require a showing of the declarant's unavailability where the
statement fits within any hearsay exception justified by a "trustwor-
thy circumstances" rationale. This, of course, is a primary rationale
for almost every hearsay exception other than the exception for for-
mer testimony. Certainly if the Court has concluded, in the face of
some evidence to the contrary, 0 that "trustworthy circumstances"
provide the rationale for the coconspirator exception, courts should
have no difficulty in drawing this conclusion as to excited utterances
or business records or official records. 3 1
The former testimony exception will likely stand practically
alone as to the requirement that the prosecution demonstrate the
hearsay declarant's unavailability. Indeed, under the Court's test in
Inadi-even as to exceptions such as dying declarations or declara-
tions against interest, where domestic law traditionally has required
a showing of the declarant's unavailability-the Court today would
probably not use the confrontation clause to mandate such a
requirement.3
2
The development of hearsay-availability cases will meet the
Supreme Court's desire to avoid both saddling the prosecution with
new requirements in the hearsay area and significantly "constitu-
tionalizing" the rule against hearsay.
28 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
29 Id. at 395-96.
30 The opposing view is that the coconspirator exception is a branch of the law of
agency and was not adopted because of belief in the reliability of coconspirator declara-
tions. See id. at 405-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., State v. Palomo, 113 Wash. 2d 789, 783 P.2d 575 (1989) (holding that
admission of an excited utterance does not require a showing of unavailability).
32 The issue could arise when a declaration fits within a state law concept of "unavail-
ability" but the defendant urges the use of a more stringent federal constitutional stan-
dard of unavailability. Compare Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) with Mancusi v.
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). It also could arise if a state did away with the requirement
of unavailability as to, for example, declarations against interest, as some commentators
have long urged. See, e.g., Note, Declarations Against Interest: A Critical Review of the Un-
availability Requirement, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 301 (1967).
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B. THE RELIABILITY OF THE HEARSAY DECLARATION
After putting to one side the declarant's availability, one must
face another difficult question: even if the declarant is unavailable,
does the confrontation clause prohibit the use of some or all hearsay
offered over the objections of a criminal defendant? One approach
would say that the clause allows any use of hearsay, as long as the
prosecution demonstrates the declarant's, unavailability.33 Domestic
law has not recognized such a broad hearsay exception, even though
some scholars have argued that the prohibition against hearsay
should never deprive the trier of fact of relevant evidence from the
lips of unavailable declarants.3 4 Thus the Supreme Court has had
no need to go beyond those restrictions already established by do-
mestic law to avoid setting new limits on the prosecution's use of
hearsay.
Instead, the Court has adopted an interpretation of the con-
frontation clause which seemingly imposes some constitutional limi-
tations in criminal cases upon the use of hearsay, even from
unavailable declarants, without, in fact, placing any significant limi-
tations upon the prosecution's use of hearsay beyond those required
by domestic law.
The Court, over academic objections,35 has said that "reliabil-
ity" is an adequate substitute for cross-examination.36 It has rea-
soned: 1) confrontation is designed to promote reliability; 2)
sometimes the use of uncross-examined statements will not under-
mine the reliability of the fact-finding process; and 3) therefore,
sometimes an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine a
hearsay declarant is unnecessary to fulfill the requirements of the
confrontation clause-namely, when attendant circumstances sur-
rounding the making of a statement tend to guarantee its
33 An analogous proposal was put forth by the drafters of ALI MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DENCE Rule 503 (1942). Without regard to constitutional considerations, the domestic
rules they proposed would have rejected hearsay challenges whenever the declarant was
unavailable.
34 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected this proposal. See FED. R.
EVID. advisory committee's introductory note to Art. VIII.
35 See, e.g., Kirst, supra note 9, at 517-20.
36 The Court began its substitution of reliability for cross-examination in its plurality
opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The theory seemingly commanded the
agreement of all ninejustices in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), although only four
dissenting justices agreed that the statement at issue was sufficiently reliable to be ad-
missible without an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the hearsay declar-
ant. Finally, in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), a majority of the Court
invoked the "reliability" standard in rejecting a confrontation clause challenge to the




If the Court stopped there, the confrontation clause could re-
quire prosecutors to demonstrate the reliability of a hearsay declara-
tion, on a statement-by-statement basis, before being permitted to
introduce a hearsay declaration which met the requirements of a do-
mestic law hearsay exception. Presumably courts would develop a
jurisprudence specifying what factors are relevant to a determina-
tion of reliability, much as some did after the plurality in Dutton38
first embarked upon the "indicia of reliability" approach to hearsay-
confrontation questions.3 9 If reliability were the only concern, it
would be difficult to see anything wrong with such an approach.
Thoughtful observers agree that many statements which fit within
the criteria of one or another of the traditional hearsay exceptions-
certainly including the coconspirator exception-are not trustwor-
thy by themselves nor in comparison to some hearsay statements
which fit within no traditional hearsay exception. 40
The Supreme Court, however, simply does not want to consti-
tutionalize the hearsay rule to such an extent. Accordingly, in
Bourjaily,41 it held that the prosecution, without being deemed guilty
of a confrontation violation, can use hearsay which falls within the
criteria of a "well-rooted" hearsay exception. This approach serves
judicial economy, but undermines the reliability of the fact-finding
process in some individual cases. Where the statement fits within a
well-rooted exception, prosecutors need not make a case-by-case
demonstration of reliability. Courts need neither develop nor apply
a constitutional jurisprudence of "reliability."
Although the Court will probably not sacrifice these important
administrative concerns, it is possible that the Court would allow a
defendant-in the name of either due process or confrontation-an
opportunity to overcome a "weighty" presumption that a statement
is reliable if it fits within a well-rooted exception to the rule against
hearsay. The Court may decide whether to read Bourjaily as creating
37 See Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 171; Lee, 476 U.S. at 530 (dictum); Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74.
38 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74.
39 These courts include those which, before Bourjaily, rejected the notion that a state-
ment which fit within the coconspirator exception, or some other well established excep-
tion, necessarily satisfied the confrontation clause. See, e.g., United States v. Fahey, 769
F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1985); Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1975); see also United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1986) (articulating eight
factors to be used to determine whether the confrontation clause permits use of the
hearsay statement in question).
40 Many statements which fit within a narrowly construed declaration against interest
exception are more reliable than some of the exaggerated coconspirator claims that A
might make about B's activities while trying to get C to join A's scheme.
41 Bou5jaily, 483 U.S. at 171,
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a conclusive presumption of reliability, or whether to view it as cre-
ating a rebuttable presumption of reliability for any statement which
fits within a well-rooted hearsay exception.
Perhaps because I favor the rebuttable presumption approach, I
find the possibility of such a development in two sources. First, the
Court in Lee v. Illinois42 held that, although third-party inculpatory
declarations against penal interest are presumptively unreliable and
fit within no well-rooted exception, the prosecution should be al-
lowed to demonstrate that, under all the surrounding circum-
stances, the weighty presumption of unreliability is overcome, thus
satisfying the confrontation clause. If the confrontation clause al-
lows the prosecution to overcome a presumption of unreliability de-
spite a statement's non-conformity to the criteria of any well-rooted
exception, it should allow the defendant an opportunity to over-
come a presumption of reliability despite a statement's conformity
to the criteria of a well-rooted exception.
Second, in the case of two significant hearsay exceptions- for
business records and for official records-the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence already allow opposition of hearsay on the ground that the
particular statement is untrustworthy even though it otherwise fits
within established criteria for the exception.43 Moreover, the catch-
all hearsay exceptions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) call for some
case-by-case adjudication of reliability.44
Under these circumstances, assuming that the Court will persist
in holding that reliability suffices as a substitute for cross-examina-
tion, the Court should allow a defendant an opportunity to demon-
strate that some hearsay statements are so unreliable that the
confrontation clause requires their exclusion-even as to statements
which fit within well-rooted hearsay exceptions.
In the hearsay-confrontation area, the Court will probably con-
sider two other issues. First, the Court must indicate which hearsay
exceptions are well-rooted. For example, suppose that where the
child is unavailable as a witness in a child sex-abuse case, a state
permits use of the child's hearsay statements which fit within neither
a traditional excited utterance exception nor a traditional prompt
complaint of rape exception. As many states expand hearsay excep-
tions to meet societal demands for successful child-abuse prosecu-
42 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986).
43 These rules provide for the exclusion of certain records where circumstances "in-
dicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8).
44 These rules allow admission of certain hearsay which fits within no other hearsay




tions, will the Court declare that such statements fall within a well-
rooted exception, so that the prosecution, under Bourjaily, need not
demonstrate the reliability of the particular statement in order to
satisfy the confrontation clause? As a second example, will the
Court hold that the exception for inculpatory declarations against
interest has become well-rooted, as more and more states follow
Federal Rule 804(b)(3), construed so as to require corroboration of
inculpatory declarations? 45 The Court must develop a test for de-
termining what is a well-rooted exception, stressing longevity, cur-
rent widespread use, or some combination of factors. 46
As to statements admissible under any domestic law exception
not considered to be well-rooted, the Court must spell out factors to
be considered under the "indicia of reliability" test used to deter-
mine whether a particular statement can survive a defendant's con-
frontation clause challenge. Lower court cases indicate that Dutton
and Lee leave some fundamental questions unanswered.47 Perhaps
the most important is the "boot-strapping" issue: may independent
evidence tending to corroborate the hearsay statement, as distin-
guished from the facts surrounding the statement itself, be consid-
ered in determining the reliability of a statement for confrontation
clause purposes?48 As long as the Court does not deem the inculpa-
tory declaration against penal interest exception to be well-rooted,
the courts will probably develop this jurisprudence of reliability pri-
45 For an extensive list of decisions permitting prosecutors to use inculpatory third-
party declarations against interest, see Haddad & Agin, supra note 18.
46 The process could be analogous to the Court's efforts to define which industries
can be subject to nonconsensual searches without a warrant issued upon probable cause
to believe that criminal evidence is to be found. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 336-37 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). I hope the process proves easier when it comes to developing guidelines for the
classification of "well-rooted" hearsay exceptions than it has been in developing guide-
lines for classifying certain industries as subject to special regulation.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1986) (using non-exhaus-
tive list of eight factors in resolving confrontation clause challenge to prosecution-spon-
sored hearsay); United States v. Alfonso, 738 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1984) (stressing, as do
many decisions, "non-crucial" nature of the hearsay as one element is multi-factor test
for evaluating confrontation clause challenges); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492,
1497-98 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that strength of corroborating
testimony should not be critical to the admissibility of the challenged hearsay); United
States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1973) (saying that use of even "crucial" or "dev-
astating" hearsay may be constitutional in absence of cross-examination).
48 Suppose that authorities discover A's fingerprints at the scene of the crime. Does
that make B's hearsay assertion that A participated in the crime more reliable? Or
should the court just examine the circumstances surrounding the making of B's state-
ment, including B's motivation? For one discussion of "bootstrapping," see State v.
Myren, 133 Wis. 2d 430, 436, 395 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1986); see also Williams, 733 F.2d at
1497-98 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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manly in the context of statements offered under that exception.49
III. CONFRONTATION LIMITATIONS UPON SUBSTANTIVE DOMESTIC
LAW RESTRICTIONS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION AND
IMPEACHMENT
Domestic civil and criminal evidence rules, while generally al-
lowing wide latitude, place some limitations upon the right of a
party to cross-examine and impeach an adverse witness. Some limi-
tations flow from policy considerations which place other values
above the search for truth. For example, domestic law may prohibit
asking an adverse witness whether he confessed to his priest a differ-
ent version of events from the one he has related on direct examina-
tion.50 Other limitations reflect a belief that the proposed cross-
examination will impede the search for truth. For example, domes-
tic law may prohibit a prosecutor from eliciting information about a
testifying defendant's dated prior conviction.51 Often those rules
whose rationale lies in the search for truth allow the trial judge a
measure of discretion in balancing probative worth versus undue
prejudice.
In contrast to its practice in hearsay-confrontation cases, the
Supreme Court, from 1968 in Smith v. Illinois52 through 1988 in
Olden,53 has been willing to use the confrontation clause to "consti-
tutionalize" cross-examination and impeachment rules.54 In indi-
vidual cases, it has "second-guessed" domestic law restrictions as
applied to a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a prosecu-
tion witness. It has done so even where, viewed as a whole, domes-
tic law permitted the defense wide latitude in cross-examining the
witness.
The Warren Court began the process in Smith. Smith concerned
an informant who testified for the prosecution in a drug case and
acknowledged on cross-examination that he had used a pseudonym
when he identified himself during direct examination. 55 The trial
judge, while allowing the defense other avenues of cross-examina-
tion, denied defense efforts to elicit from the witness his true name
49 See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Kusek, 844 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 157 (1989).
50 Mostjurisdictions have a privilege which protects certain confidential communica-
tions made to clergymen. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 8-803 (1989).
51 See FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
52 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
53 Olden v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988).
54 See also, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
55 Smith, 390 U.S. at 135 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and address. 56 In fact, the defendant had known both the witness
and one of his friends for a time, and defense counsel had once rep-
resented the witness.
57
The Smith Court invalidated on confrontation grounds the state
trial judge's restriction of cross-examination. It relied upon Alford v.
United States,58 a case not of constitutional dimension. In Alford, the
Court held on domestic law grounds that a federal judge should
have allowed defense counsel to elicit testimony that a prosecution
witness was currently residing in federal custody. 59 Traditional evi-
dence rules ordinarily permit examination of a witness concerning
his or her address so that the trier of fact can consider where the
witness is "coming from" in assessing his or her credibility.60 The
Alford Court was more concerned that proof of federal custody
might help the jury assess whether the witness had a bias or motive
to give testimony favoring the government. 6' Thus the Court over-
ruled the trial judge, without suggesting that the confrontation
clause mandated such a result.
Once the witness in Smith admitted that his true name was not
"James Jordan," testimony about his true name would hardly seem
to be of an impeaching nature. Whether the witness was named
Able or Baker or Cain, by itself, would make no difference. This
distinction should have made Alford inapposite. At the same time, a
generalized concern for the safety of informants might represent a
legitimate state interest in prohibiting questions concerning the true
names and addresses of informants.
Nevertheless, the Smith Court invoked Alford as precedent for
invalidating, on confrontation clause grounds, the limitation which
prohibited Smith from pursuing one line of cross-examination. 62 By
invalidating the limitation, Smith appeared to create an opening for
the Court to use the confrontation clause to constitutionalize crimi-
nal discovery. The Smith Court declared, "The witness' name and
address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-
court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the




58 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
59 Id. at 693.
60 Id. at 691-93.
61 Id. at 693.
62 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 132 (1968).
63 Id. at 131.
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As this Article discusses lat&, Smith has not led down a road of
constitutionally-mandated discovery.64 Rather it has led to a series
of decisions in which the Court has invalidated, on a case-by-case
basis, a variety of trial court domestic law limitations upon defense
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
A. THE PROBATIVE WORTH CASES
OMen is among the most recent of the probative worth cases.
There the defense contended that the female complainant in a sex-
ual assault case had constructed her story in order to deceive a male
friend as a means of explaining her presence in the defendant's
company. 65 When the male friend testified for the prosecution, the
trial judge sustained objections to defense questions designed to
demonstrate that the male witness and the female complainant had
lived together.66 The judge believed that undue prejudice to the
search for truth would outweigh whatever value the evidence would
have for impeachment. That possibility existed, he said, because the
Kentucky jury might be disturbed that the complainant was Cauca-
sian and her male lover, the witness, was Black. 67 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the confrontation clause required that
the defense be able to explore the relationship between the com-
plainant and the male witness. 68
The balancing process seems to support the Supreme Court's
rejection of the trial judge's conclusion that sustaining the prosecu-
tion objections would further the search for truth. However, in the
absence of wholesale limitations upon cross-examination, why
should the Supreme Court use the confrontation clause to dictate to
a state the proper scope of cross-examination and impeachment?
Especially in the area of probative worth versus undue prejudice, as
distinguished from the privilege area, courts cannot articulate
hardfast rules. Accordingly, federal court intervention through the
confrontation clause, as demonstrated by Olden, will amount to
second-guessing on a case-by-case basis and cannot hope to yield
any firm doctrine. Hence the Olden line greatly departs from the
approach of the hearsay cases, as embodied in Bourjaily.69 The
Bourlaily message is that even if confrontation concerns should
64 See infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
65 Olden v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 480, 482 (1988).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 484.
69 See supra text accompanying note 41.
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shape the rules of evidence, they must not do so on a case-by-case
basis, as distinguished from a category-by-category basis.
The Court, through its hearsay decisions, allows prosecutors
the right to use hearsay accusations without affording the defendant
any cross-examination of an accuser or even an opportunity to argue
against admissibility on reliability grounds. Why has the Court then
used the confrontation clause to strike down limitations upon partic-
ular restrictions on cross-examination of those accusers who do ap-
pear, even where the state trial court has otherwise allowed wide
latitude in cross-examination?
Moreover, the same Court which evidences an unwillingness in
the hearsay area to rewrite evidence rules in the name of confronta-
tion seems to have opened the door to constitutionalizing the area
of legal relevance--extending the reach of the confrontation clause
even beyond regulation of the proper scope of cross-examination.
As I read Olden, if the witness, having been required to answer ques-
tions concerning his relationship with the complainant, denied a
sexual relationship, the confrontation clause would have mandated
that the defendant be allowed to call witnesses to impeach his de-
nial.70 Courts may be venturing far, in the name of confrontation,
to shape basic rules of relevance and to second-guess the domestic
law weighing of probative worth versus prejudice.
Professor Ronald Allen has pointed out that the hearsay cases
and the impeachment cases are compatible in one sense: both favor
the admissibility of evidence, whether offered by the prosecution or
the defense. 71 Recognizing that functional regularity, I still seek
doctrinal consistency.
The Supreme Court will probably someday reconsider the
Smith-Olden line of decisions in light of its hearsay-confrontation rul-
ings. The Court may retreat from its present approach and leave to
domestic law the balancing of probative worth against undue preju-
dice, with respect to both cross-examination and extrinsic impeach-
ment evidence.
B. THE EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE CASES
Where the defendant asserts that invocation of an otherwise
70 See Olden, 109 S. Ct. at 482. The Supreme Court opinion does not indicate pre-
cisely whether the trial court excluded extrinsic evidence of the relationship. Wholly
apart from probative worth issues, some courts allow extrinsic evidence of bias only
where the opponent confronted the witness with the alleged source of bias. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 40, at 87 (3d ed. 1984).




proper privilege would impermissibly limit his or her confrontation
rights, courts must struggle to apply the line of decisions which be-
gan with Davis.72 In Davis, a domestic evidentiary -privilege pro-
tected against revelation of juvenile delinquency matters where the
prosecution witness was on juvenile probation.73 The Supreme
Court held that to prohibit this avenue of cross-examination, which
might expose a motive for the witness to cooperate with the prose-
cution, would be to deny the defendant his confrontation clause
rights.74 Society cannot benefit from the policies underlying the
confrontation clause and, at the same time, benefit from the testi-
mony of the witness. Phrased another way, courts cannot make the
defendant bear the cost of the privilege, even when the price is the
shutting off of but one avenue of cross-examination. 75
The privilege cases are inconsistent with the spirit of the hear-
say cases. The hearsay cases hold that often confrontation is ade-
quate without any cross-examination. The privilege cases declare
that cross-examination limited in but one respect is inadequate.
The hearsay cases are unwilling to use the confrontation clause to
constitutionalize the rules of evidence. The privilege cases use the
clause for just such a purpose.
The privilege cases are different from the probative worth-
undue prejudice cases in that they may allow for something more
than case-by-case adjudication. Courts may be able to determine
which privileges must give way to confrontation and which may
stand. For example, if the prosecution is to benefit from the testi-
mony of a witness, must the defendant be allowed to explore con-
versations between the witness and the lawyer for the witness if such
conversations, but for the privilege, would be proper material for
impeaching the witness's present version of events? Thus far, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has articulated no guidelines for determin-
ing which privileges must fall in the path of a defendant's right to
confront witnesses. 76
Some domestic limitations upon cross-examination are based
upon notions of both limited probative Worth and policy-privilege-
for example, rape shield statutes and statutes denying admission of
dated convictions of non-party witnesses. Faced with a defense
72 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
73 Id. at 310-11.
74 Id. at 317-18.
75 For a recent treatment of the "privilege" cases, which considers confrontation,
compulsory process, and due process, see White, Evidentiay Privileges and the Defendant's




claim that the restrictions violate the defendant's confrontation
rights, the United States Supreme Court will probably establish limi-
tations upon the use of the confrontation clause to rewrite domestic
principles concerning cross-examination and impeachment.
IV. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE MODE OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION: CROSS-EXAMINATION WITHOUT
CONFRONTATION
In a third line of cases, the Supreme Court has established that
a confrontation clause violation may occur even where domestic law
has not prevented a defendant from asking the prosecution witness
even a single question from among those which he or she desires to
pose. This line of cases contrasts with the hearsay cases, where do-
mestic law has afforded no cross-examination, and with the substan-
tive cross-examination limitation cases, where domestic law has
restricted one avenue of cross-examination.
The issues in the third line arise in the context of domestic law
departures from the normal mode of witness examination. Usually
direct examination and cross-examination occur in the presence of
the trier of fact. The defendant and the witness are both present,
each able to view the other. The cross-examination immediately fol-
lows the direct-examination.
In certain kinds of cases, generally to ease the discomfort of
young witnesses or alleged sexual assault victims, many jurisdictions
recently have departed from the procedural norms for examination
of witnesses. The law, for example, may permit the witness to be in
a room separate from the defendant and the jury at the time of the
examination, as his or her testimony is televised live to the court-
room.77 The testimony of the witness may also be taken in the de-
fendant's presence but out of the jury's presence, with the jury
viewing either a live or a taped telecast of the testimony. 78 Another
variation provides that the direct testimony of the witness, given in
the presence of the defendant, may be presented on tape to the jury,
with cross-examination occurring in the defendant's and the jury's
presence, but with a delay between the earlier taped direct testi-
mony and the opportunity for cross-examination.
79
In Coy, 80 the Supreme Court invalidated a procedure in which,
without any particularized showing of necessity, young, alleged vic-
77 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
78 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 17-8-5 (Supp. 1977).
79 See, e.g., People v. Bastien, 129 II. 2d 64, 541 N.E.2d 670 (1989) (procedure
invalidated).
80 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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tims of a sexual assault were allowed to testify against the alleged
offender while they were behind a screen. To some extent, the de-
fendant could see the teenage accusers, but they could not see him
at all. The Court held that the right of a "face-to-face" meeting is
part of the confrontation clause protection.8' Citing President Ei-
senhower's reflections upon Kansas justice in his youth, the Court
noted that the right of the accused to stand face to face with his
accuser serves both the appearance and the reality of fair proce-
dure.8 2 The very trauma that flows from a face-to-face meeting may
make it more difficult for someone to accuse another falsely. The
Court said that nothing can compel the accuser to look the accused
in the eye, but if the accuser looks away, the jury can assess such
conduct in evaluating credibility.83 It added that although some
strong interest might create an exception to the right to face-to-face
confrontation, the Court would not approve the 1985 Iowa stat-
ute.8 4 That statute created a presumption that, in sex abuse cases,
the alleged, youthful victim would always be so traumatized as to
permit use of the Iowa "screening" procedures.8 5 Nor would the
Court comment upon the validity of other procedural departures
from the normal mode of cross-examination.86
I cannot reconcile this line of cases with the hearsay-confronta-
tion cases. Suppose that a young witness, shortly after an alleged
offense, made an out-of-court accusation against the accused which
fit the criteria of the "well-rooted" exception for excited utterances.
Under such circumstances, very likely, even when the witness, for
whatever reason, did not appear for cross-examination, the confron-
tation clause would permit the trial court to admit that statement for
its truth without any individualized scrutiny of the statement's relia-
bility. In such a case, the accuser would never stand "face to face"
with the accused. Yet if that witness instead came to court and an-
swered every question posed by the defense, the use of a one-way
mirror between witness and accused would violate the confrontation
clause absent an individualized showing of necessity for such a
procedure.
Perhaps there is room to use the confrontation clause to invali-
date procedural limitations upon cross-examination. However, the
Supreme Court should not elevate procedural limitations over sub-
81 Id. at 1016.
82 Id. at 1017-18.
83 Id. at 1019.
84 Id. at 1020-21.
85 IowA CODE 910A.14 (1987).
86 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
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stantive limits on cross-examination. Suppose that the defense has a
choice between 1) either no cross-examination or cross-examination
which is somewhat limited, perhaps because of an evidentiary privi-
lege and 2) unlimited cross-examination, marred only by the pres-
ence of a one-way mirror placed between the witness and the
defendant. Surely the defense would prefer to pose the questions.
Professor Ian Ayres has suggested that defenders of the Court
might distinguish the hearsay-confrontation cases from cases involv-
ing either substantive or procedural limitations upon cross-exami-
nation.8 7 They might contend that live testimony has a special
impact. Thus when the witness appears and gives direct testimony
before the trier of fact, the confrontation clause ordinarily disdains
limitations upon cross-examination and upon face-to-face confron-
tation. Hearsay testimony has less impact; therefore, cross-exami-
nation and face-to-face confrontation are less important where the
"witness" is hearsay declarant.
My response is twofold. First, as a matter of law, both hearsay
and live testimony are significant: the assertions of fact contained in
either may get the prosecution beyond the directed-verdict zone.
Second, as the Supreme Court in Inadi has noted, a thoughtful per-
son would often give greater credence to a hearsay statement than
to in-court testimony. 88 The assertion that hearsay which fits within
a domestic law hearsay exception-from dying declarations to
coconspirator statements-has little impact when compared to
courtroom testimony is too slender a trellis to support the argument
for denying cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation in one
case but requiring it in the other.
In the future, the Court will evaluate other sorts of departures
from procedural norms in examining witnesses.8 9 Unfortunately,
Coy gives little guidance. Even though, unlike some state law coun-
terparts, the confrontation clause does not use the term "face to
face," the Coy Court placed literal emphasis upon that concept. The
Court should avoid applying the concept of face-to-face in as rigid a
manner in the future as it did in Coy. Instead, if it continues to inval-
idate procedural restrictions where no substantive limitations upon
cross-examination are at issue, it should consider whether the pro-
87 Discussion with Professor Ian Ayres, Professor of Law, Northwestern University
(Feb. 1990).
88 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986). See supra text accompanying note
28.
89 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S.
Ct. 834 (1990), vacated and remanded, 58 U.S.L.W. 5044 (U.S. June 27, 1990) (No. 89-
478). For a discussion of Craig, see supra note 19.
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cedure allows the trier of fact a meaningful opportunity to scrutinize
the demeanor of the witness.
As long as the Court gives broad approval to the use of hear-
say-where the trier of fact may have no opportunity to scrutinize
the declarant's demeanor-consistency mandates that the Court not
conclude that a procedure such as the presentation to a jury of vide-
otaped testimony fails to provide a constitutionally adequate oppor-
tunity for demeanor scrutiny.
V. CONFRONTATION AND DISCOVERY
Except as to exculpatory evidence, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to constitutionalize criminal discovery. Apart from Brady
material, 90 and except for disclosure of informers in certain cases, 9'
the Court has mandated that the prosecution disclose only recipro-
cal information when a jurisdiction requires discovery to flow from
the defense to the prosecution. 92 Under the Court's analysis, pre-
sumably, if the defense must disclose the names and addresses of
alibi witnesses, the prosecution must disclose the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses who would rebut the alibi. Arguably, if the de-
fense must reveal in advance of trial the written statements of its
witnesses, so also must the prosecution. Absent obligations im-
posed upon the defense, however, the Court has not mandated that
the prosecution reveal before trial the names or addresses of its wit-
nesses or anything that would reveal to the defense the expected
substance of their testimony.
Smith, discussed above,93 pointed toward a road not taken. A
court which, like the Smith Court, declared that knowledge of the
true name and address of a witness is the starting point for meaning-
ful out-of-court investigation and effective in-court cross-examina-
tion might well use the confrontation clause to mandate broad
pretrial discovery. In the real world, where mid-trial continuances
are necessarily rare, revelation at trial of the names and addresses of
the witnesses, and of the substance of their testimony, may come too
late to make cross-examination effective.
However, in Ritchie, a plurality of the Court emphasized that
nothing in the right of confrontation mandates that the defendant
be afforded pretrial discovery. 94 A majority of the Court seriously
questioned whether even the compulsory process clause could serve
90 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
91 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
92 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
93 See supra text accompanying notes 52-64.
94 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987).
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to require any pretrial disclosure.9 5 The Ritchie Court employed a
due process analysis which, at best, would require pretrial disclosure
of favorable material.
Thus the confrontation clause appears to be a dead letter in the
area of pretrial discovery. Those who believe that discovery in crim-
inal cases advances the search for truth might lament this fact, espe-
cially if they believe that the Supreme Court should concentrate its
constitutional criminal procedural energies on decisions which up-
grade the reliability of the factfinding process. 96
On the other hand, Ritchie is consistent with the hearsay-con-
frontation cases. It keeps the Court out of adjectival areas normally
left to domestic law. It leaves it to states to both determine which
procedures best serve the goal of reliability and balance reliability
concerns against other considerations. It avoids case-by-case consti-
tutional adjudication. For these reasons, when the Court evaluates
the various lines of confrontation clause cases in light of each other,
it is not likely to use the confrontation clause to shape pretrial
discovery.
VI. THE BRUTON LIMrrING-INSTRUCTION ANOMALY:
CONFRONTATION DISAPPROVAL OF DE FACTO USE OF
HEARSAY WHERE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
WOULD APPROVE DE JURE USE
In 1980 and more fully in 1990, I have written concerning a
confrontation clause anomaly to which Professor Seidelson also
made brief reference in 1988.97 As Professor Seidelson stated,
there are two lines of cases which, at some point, may cross paths.98
In the Bruton line, the Supreme Court has held that, where domestic
law makes a codefendant's confession inadmissible as to the defend-
ant, the confrontation clause prohibits the prosecution from making
de facto use of that confession, at least where the confessing code-
fendant does not testify and make himself available for cross-exami-
nation by the defendant. 99 In Dutton and Lee, however, the Court
has indicated that sometimes the codefendant's confession may bear
95 Id. at 56.
96 United States District CourtJudge James B. Zagel stated these views in an unpub-
lished lecture he delivered before becoming a judge. For a discussion ofJudge Zagel's
speech, see Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Ration-
ale, and a Proposal for a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 AMER. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 34 n.175 (1980).
97 See Haddad, supra note 96; Haddad & Agin, supra note 18; Seidelson, supra note 9,
at 82-90.
98 Seidelson, supra note 9, at 82-90.
99 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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adequate "indicia of reliability" so that a domestic law hearsay ex-
ception which permitted use of the codefendant's confession in
resolving the defendant's guilt would not violate the confrontation
clause.' 00
Thus if State X chooses to make A's confession de jure admissi-
ble against B under a declaration against penal interest hearsay ex-
ception, it will not necessarily violate B's confrontation rights even
when A does not testify. However, if State X deems A's confession
inadmissible but, so that the defendants can be tried jointly, uses a
presumptively ineffective limiting instruction procedure, Bruton
seems to say that the procedure amounts to a de facto use of A's
confession against B which violates B's right to confront witnesses.
This anomaly cannot stand scrutiny' 01 as prosecutors finally be-
gin to focus attention on it.102 It is probable that the Court eventu-
ally will withdraw its support from the confrontation clause rationale
for Bruton and will come to view the Bruton problem in its proper
context. The Court will ask whether a jurisdiction which, under do-
mestic law, absent any constitutional compulsion, has deemed evi-
dence inadmissible, or admissible only for a limited purpose, may
undermine its own policy decision by utilizing ajury instruction that
is likely to be ineffective. I do not know the answer to that question,
but the answer will probably come wrapped in a procedural fairness-
due process garb. Thus if the Court declares that the state cannot
make de facto use of a hearsay declaration where the confrontation
clause would have permitted the dejure use, the Court will declare
that the state's abandonment of its own evidentiary policy violates
due process of law.' 03
VII. CONCLUSION
One need not be a student of the development of the law to
observe that parallel lines of cases in related areas eventually may
influence one another, or that periodically a court will feel obligated
to synthesize its own precedents. The future of the confrontation
clause lies in such a process. Confrontation decisions cannot for-
ever stand in such different parts of a liberal-conservative spectrum.
100 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 539
(1986); see supra text accompanying note 42; Haddad & Agin, supra note 18.
101 For a complete analysis of this anomaly, see Haddad & Agin, supra note 18.
102 Prosecutors have finally begun to seek to avoid Bruton by arguing that severance is
not required where the codefendant's statement is reliable enough to satisfy the con-
frontation clause even though domestic law prohibits use of the statement as evidence
against the defendant. For cases illustrating this point, see Haddad & Agin, supra note
18.
103 See Haddad & Agin, supra note 18.
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Of course the composition of the Court at the time of the synthesis
will greatly determine which cases fall.
If the Court does not take a sharp turn in favor of the rights of
the accused, the philosophy of the hearsay-confrontation line of
cases should prevail. The Court will be most reluctant to use the
confrontation clause to reshape prevailing domestic evidentiary and
procedural rules, especially where intervention would be on a case-
by-case basis. Thus decisions in the tradition of Dutton, Inadi,
Bourjaily, and Ritchie will ascend. The future does not bode well for
the would-be progeny of Smith, Davis, Olden, Coy, or Bruton. The
Court might well overrule some of these decisions or significantly
limit their application.
